CCD/PV.456
10 March 1970
ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

GOVT PUBLS DEPT.

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I declare open the 456th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): I should like to join previous speakers in welcoming our new colleagues, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro of Brazil, Ambassador Abe of Japan, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, Ambassador Natorf of Poland and Ambassador Datcu of Romania, and to wish all of them success in carrying out their responsible functions. I should also like to greet Ambassador Dugersuren, representative of Mongolia; Mr. Vratusa, Deputy Secretary of State, representative of Yugoslavia; and Lord Chalfont, the United Kingdom representative, on this occasion when they are participating anew in our work. I should like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Epstein, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, whose contribution is so vital to the activities of our Committee.

3. Prior to entering into the substantial questions before the Committee, allow me to point out some major common features of the contributions made so far. I think that the period that has elapsed and the statements made so far provide a basis for our work. My delegation is pleased to note that without exception the statements have reflected the desire to achieve concrete results during this session. The other major common feature of the contributions is an increased interest in and attention to questions of general and complete disarmament. This leads me to express the belief of the Hungarian delegation that during this session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament substantial progress will be made in solving the problems under consideration.

4. Each year, at the beginning of a new session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is our task to face the problems to be solved in order to meet as far as possible the expectations of mankind. This is all the more true now when, following the sixties, we are facing a new decade which has been declared by the General Assembly the Disarmament Decade (resolution 2602 E (XXIV); CCD/275).

5. The existing situation in the arms race and disarmament, the concerns and hopes of the world community and consequently the tasks before us at the beginning of the new decade were excellently outlined in the statement made by the Secretary-General before the Committee (CCD/PV.450). My delegation, like many others, considers the Secretary-General's statement to be a highly important contribution to the work of our Committee and to deserve our continuing attention.

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6. Much has already been said by previous speakers about the fact that during the past decade no substantial progress has been made in the field of disarmament. Many facts and figures were mentioned in this connexion, and I consider there is no need to repeat them. Although the past decade was overshadowed by the continuing and increasing arms race and the growing dangers inherent in the most sophisticated weapon systems, at the beginning of the new decade the world community has some hopes and encouragement for the seventies in the field of disarmament. In this connexion I should like to mention first of all the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) and the continuation of the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

7. My delegation has had occasion to indicate the opinion of the Hungarian Government that one of the greatest achievements of this Committee so far has been the preparation of the non-proliferation Treaty. Hungary was among the first to sign and ratify this Treaty because it believes it will slow down the nuclear arms race and avert the danger of a thermonuclear war.

8. Today it is a special pleasure for my delegation to be among the first to welcome the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty towards which the decisive step was taken on Thursday of last week by the Soviet Union and the United States in depositing the instruments of ratification. It is a great pleasure for me to be among the first to congratulate the co-Chairmen of our Committee, Mr. Roshchin, representative of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Leonard, representative of the United States. At the same time my delegation's congratulations go to all members of this Committee who contributed to the preparation of the Treaty.

9. On this solemn occasion, permit me to recall the desire and striving of the contracting parties, solemnly expressed in the preamble to the Treaty, to —

> "... further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control ..." (ENDC/226*)

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

10. This solemn declaration has now become a binding commitment for the States parties to this Treaty according to article VI of the operative part of the Treaty. This idea was underlined by Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in his statement in Moscow on the occasion of the depositing of the instruments of ratification, when he said:

"Now, with the Treaty's entry into force, the obligation to refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes one of the most important standards of international law. Even those States which are not parties to the Treaty cannot fail to take this international standard into account. On them too lies the responsibility as to whether a limit will be set to the proliferation of nuclear weapons." (CCD/279)

11. Now, when we are welcoming the entry into force of this Treaty of historical significance, I would like to express the firm conviction of the Hungarian delegation that this act represents a very important contribution to the realization of the lofty aims embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. It is also the conviction of my delegation that the entry into force of this Treaty will create better possibilities for attaining new results in the field of disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the entry into force of the Treaty will promote accession to and ratification of the Treaty by all those States which have not yet adhered to and ratified it. In this connexion my delegation attaches great importance to the fact that Sweden has ratified and the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Indonesia have signed the Treaty.

12. The Hungarian delegation is convinced that the entry into force of the Treaty provides new conditions for the peaceful use of atomic energy, the importance of which for development is almost immeasurable. That is why we followed with keen interest the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes about which Mr. Roshchin, head of the Soviet delegation, was kind enough to inform the Committee at its meeting on 24 February (CCD/PV.452, para. 82). The entry into force of the Treaty gives special topicality and urgency to the elaboration of safeguards in connexion with article III of the Treaty within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hungary, as a party to this Treaty, wishes to take part in the elaboration and practical implementation of those safeguards.

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13. Still fresh in our memory are the days during the last session of the General Assembly when we learned of and welcomed the Soviet-American preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation, which have taken place meanwhile in Helsinki. Now when our Committee's work is in full swing we are looking forward expectantly to the resumption of the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna next month. My Government attaches great importance to those bilateral negotiations, because if successful they can make a great contribution to easing tension and to limiting the nuclear arms race. All this can have a favourable impact on the work carried out within the framework of this Committee and on the international situation as a whole. I should like to take this opportunity to express my Government's appreciation to the Governments of our cousin Finland and our neighbour Austria which are the host countries to those talks.

14. My Government's foreign policy concentrates on the strengthening of international peace and security, and my country, since it is a European socialist State, attributes particular importance to the strengthening of security on our continent. From a historical point of view, since the end of the war peace has existed in Europe for a long time. But this peace is relative, because it is often endangered by tensions. To stabilize European security the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty initiated in Budapest a year ago the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation; and they made proposals concerning the agenda of that conference at their Prague meeting last October. It is our conviction that the conditions for holding this conference are gradually maturing. We are convinced too that a European conference on security and co-operation would further improve the political atmosphere and would help the creation of an institutionalized system of European security and thus contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. It is almost unnecessary for me to add that this course of events would have a very positive influence in the field of disarmament.

15. Turning now to the main tasks before our Committee, I should like to deal first with the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. My delegation believes that this problem deserves high priority in the work of our Committee.

16. This Committee knows that it was the Hungarian delegation at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly which initiated resolution 2162 B (XXI), which was supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States. That resolution

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underlined the importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575, p.117) prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological means of warfare. At the last session of the General Assembly the Hungarian delegation, together with eight other socialist delegations, was a co-sponsor of a draft international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655).

17. The discussions during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly clearly demonstrated the importance and urgency which the overwhelming majority of States attach to the radical and comprehensive solution of this highly important problem. Resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which was adopted unanimously, gives a clear mandate to our Committee. In our opinion we must respond to this in a positive manner and we must start without delay the preparation of a comprehensive international convention on prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons. The Hungarian delegation considers that the draft submitted last year by nine socialist delegations to the General Assembly, which was favourably received by the majority of the delegations and is before this Committee at present, provides a sound basis for the preparation of such a multilateral international convention.

18. My delegation, with other co-sponsors of the draft international convention, is studying the various comments and proposals which have been made in connexion with that draft. We are considering them with care and shall do our best to take them into account in developing certain provisions of the draft. We should welcome any further constructive proposals. My delegation appreciates the statement by Mr. Natorf of Poland at the meeting of the Committee on 24 February that Polish experts are now working out proposals to strengthen the safeguard provisions of the draft international convention (CCD/PV.452, para.18). As a co-sponsor of the draft convention my delegation welcomes this initiative and will take part in the drafting of those provisions.

19. In conformity with the views expressed by other delegations in the General Assembly and here in the Committee, the Hungarian delegation has called for and advocated the joint prohibition of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and will continue to do so. In our opinion, these means of mass destruction should be treated jointly from the point of view of their prohibition. Any other approach, or separating them in respect of their prohibition or restrictive interpretation of

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the provisions of prohibition, might only create complications and confusion which would contradict our efforts and determined endeavours made so far to achieve the complete prohibition of these deadly weapons and their elimination from military arsenals.

20. In dealing with the prohibition and complete elimination of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons we have to pay due attention to the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has acquired historical significance as an international instrument prohibiting the use of all chemical and bacteriological agents in war. For this reason my delegation attaches great importance to General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which repeatedly invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of this year in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. Members of this Committee will recall that this was proposed originally by Mr. Dugersuren of Mongolia in this Committee last year.

21. Another very important task before our Committee -- as stated already by many delegations -- is the preparation of an international treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. My delegation shares the view that there is a possibility of working out this treaty in a relatively short time. The draft treaty submitted by the two co-Chairmen on 30 October last year (CCD/269/Rev.1) was widely discussed in the First Committee during the last session of the General Assembly. My delegation holds the view that the working papers submitted by Argentina (A/C.1/997), Brazil (ENDC/264, CCD/267), Canada (CCD/270), Mexico (A/C.1/995) and Sweden (CCD/271) contain important and useful elements deserving careful consideration.

22. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation the conclusion of such a treaty would be only the first but a very important step towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, which is our ultimate goal. This is why my delegation deems it necessary to insert the third preambular paragraph of the present draft in the operative part of the draft. In this connexion the Hungarian delegation supports wholeheartedly the proposal of the Swedish delegation contained in document CCD/271. At the present stage, when the co-Chairmen are studying the various working

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papers, proposals and comments and while consultations are going on, my delegation would like to express its hope that these new efforts will lead to the preparation of a generally-acceptable sea-bed treaty.

23. Last but not least, I would like to deal with questions of general and complete disarmament in connexion with the Disarmament Decade. The last session of the General Assembly, the proclamation of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade, the statements so far made in this Committee, clearly demonstrate the growing attention which the world community gives to this problem. Now, by the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, States parties to the Treaty are by article VI in duty bound —

> "...to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (ENDC/226*)

24. The other factor making it necessary to deal with the questions of general and complete disarmament is that since 1962, when the Soviet and American drafts for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) were introduced, significant changes have taken place in the international scene. That is why my delegation, too, considers it timely to have an exchange of views in this Committee on general and complete disarmament.

25. The Hungarian delegation has followed with keen interest the proposals made so far concerning general and complete disarmament, and is studying them with the utmost attention. At the present stage my delegation joins those delegations which have expressed the opinion that it would not be useful to build up a rigid and detailed plan containing aims to be achieved and at the same time to favour a flexible approach to the Disarmament Decade. What my delegation has in mind is to secure solid progress in the field of disarmament and to avoid unfounded expectations which could later turn to disillusionment. In this connexion the Hungarian delegation considers it necessary to emphasize again the organic interrelationship between partial disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament.

26. In conclusion, I would like to express again my delegation's hope that the present session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will reach concrete results in the field of disarmament, in which the Hungarian delegation offers its co-operation.

27. Mr. VRATUSA (Yugoslavia): Before passing to the substance of my statement, I venture to associate myself and my delegation with other delegations in welcoming the new representatives of Brazil, Ambassador Guerreiro; Japan, Ambassador Abe; Morocco, Ambassador El Fassi; Poland, Ambassador Natorf; and Romania, Ambassador Datcu. I would like to extend to them sincere wishes for successful work in this session of the Committee. I desire also to extend our warm greetings to Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, whose long experience will no doubt be of great assistance to us in the future too.

28. This is the first meeting of our Committee since the entry into force of the non-proliferarion Treaty (ENDC/226*), a far-reaching international treaty in the negotiation of which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has played an important role. It is therefore natural that we in this Committee should refer to the Treaty now with deep appreciation of the efforts of all who have contributed to its completion, and with our minds addressed to new tasks, especially in connexion with the implementation of the Treaty.

29. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the non-proliferation Treaty on 27 February of this year, and on that occasion the Yugoslav Government issued a Declaration which, with the permission of the Committee, I shall read:

"In connexion with the adoption by the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Law on the Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to reaffirm its conviction that the Treaty will contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, facilitate the setting in motion of the process of nuclear disarmament and stimulate the trend towards general and complete disarmament. The Government of Yugoslavia attaches great importance to further efforts by all countries to create a universal system of international security that would ensure a lasting peace and create conditions for an accelerated development in the whole world. Although the realization of this objective necessarily calls for an essential change in the existing practices in international relations, which are so often characterized by inequality, interference in internal affairs of other countries and the power policy, the Government of Yugoslavia considers that the non-proliferation Treaty, and similar collateral measures, can constitute a beneficial contribution to the search for peace and international security.

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"On this occasion the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to recall that prior to the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been exerting efforts, together with other countries, to eliminate some of its deficiencies in order to make it more acceptable to the non-nuclear-weapon States. These efforts have produced definite results. Many of these positions are contained in the Memorandum of the Government of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament dated 3 May 1965, and in the Statement of 11 April 1968, issued by the Government of Yugoslavia, relating to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"In this connexion the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to set forth the motives and expectations which have guided it in proposing to the Federal Assembly to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"The Government of Yugoslavia, viewing this Treaty against the background of the search for peace, general and complete disarmament, international security and development:

"1. Considers the ban on the development, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of them to be indispensable for the maintenance of a stable peace and international security, and expects the nuclear-weapon powers to display, with this objective in mind, their willingness to conclude a convention on the general renunciation of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

"2. Holds the view that the chief responsibility for the progress in this direction rests with the nuclear-weapon powers and expects them to show maximum good will and determination to embark upon that road, a matter made obligatory upon them also by the fact that non-nuclear-weapon states, party to the Treaty have voluntarily renounced to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

"3. Expects that the already initiated talks between the super Powers relating to containment and cessation of the race in the development and production of the strategic nuclear arms will be expanded also to the so-called tactical nuclear weapons and lead to the prohibition of the stationing of these arms in the areas free thereof, to the withdrawal from alien territories within one's own

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state borders and to the discontinuance of the training of the non-nuclear-weapon states' armed forces in the use of nuclear weapons, creating thereby favourable conditions for even more far-reaching measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

"4. Lends its support to every action aimed at creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and the thinned armament zones, as significant measures for the easing of tensions and strengthening of international security.

"5. Notes that the continuance of nuclear-weapon tests is inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the non-proliferation Treaty and considers it indispensable for the nuclear-weapon powers to initiate, at an early date, negotiations for the completion of the Moscow Agreement.

"6. Attaches special importance to finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon states and expects nuclear-weapon powers, on the one hand, to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the countries having renounced them as well as against non-nuclear-weapon states in general, and to refrain from the threat to use them, and, on the other hand, expects that in the event of such a threat, the United Nations will act in such a manner as shall ensure effective protection of the non-nuclear-weapon states.

"7. Considers that the Non-Proliferation Treaty makes all the states parties entitled to full and unhampered utilization, on a non-discriminatory basis, of all the achievements of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosions, through appropriate international procedures yet to be established.

"8. Believes that all countries will be ensured the same treatment with regard to the contents and modalities of control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that the expenditure for the system of control will be regulated in a way not burdening the non-nuclear-weapon states and, in particular, the developing countries.

"9. Requests the nuclear-weapon states parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to render all the appropriate assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon states in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and expects the International Atomic Energy Agency to adjust itself more fully to the current needs of the international community, particularly to those of the developing countries.

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"The Government of Yugoslavia emphasizes once again the great significance it attaches to the universality of the efforts relating to the realization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the belief that all states parties will make their greatest possible contribution to have the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty fully and constructively applied, in order to facilitate, inter alia, the accession of all countries to the Treaty." (CCD/278)

30. As has often been stated, the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty represents not an end in itself but rather the beginning of hard work for the achievement of the aims which are closely interrelated with the successful implementation of that Treaty in order to halt the atomic arms race and open a wider process towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is encouraging that the declarations and statements made by governments and their representatives on this occasion have in common the readiness and the will to continue efforts aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and at effective progress in the field of disarmament. That attitude reflects and confirms our belief that only the speedy and consistent implementation of the Treaty can ensure its stability and durability, and thereby create conditions enabling other countries to accede to it. We hope that this Committee, which played an important role in hammering out the Treaty, will not fail to contribute to the effective realization of those objectives too.

31. I will now turn to other issues on the agenda of the Committee. The first question to which I should like to refer is that of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. In our opinion this is an issue of immediate concern to us. It represents an essential aspect of disarmament. In addition, the Committee has been requested by the General Assembly of the United Nations to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibitions and other measures referred to in the draft conventions submitted respectively by nine socialist States (A/7655) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1), and to report to the General Assembly (resolution 2603 B (XXIV); CCD/275).

32. This Committee had already had a comprehensive discussion on this subject before the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The detailed debate in that world organization last autumn further elaborated this problem. We now have at our disposal two draft conventions and valuable documentation. Therefore we should be able to come considerably closer to the solution of this problem in the course of this year. The differences in the positions of individual countries, although some of them are wide, should not be considered unbridgeable.

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33. At last year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and again at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Yugoslav delegation explained its position in regard to the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. For us, the essence of this matter is settled by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p.117) as confirmed by a number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, and more particularly and more comprehensively by resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which we co-sponsored. That resolution states the clear understanding of the world community of nations as to what is prohibited in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The fact that only three countries voted against that resolution, only two of them being parties to the Geneva Protocol, shows how large is the international consensus in this respect.

34. We hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will be able to establish common ground from which the negotiations on further prohibitions may be successfully undertaken. As to the question of approach, we feel it is in the general interest to seek a solution for both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons now. In this regard we welcome with appreciation the statement of Lord Chalfont about the readiness of the United Kingdom delegation to follow the wish of the majority to discuss the prospects of progress on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons together (CCD/PV.451, para.18), since this will help us to avoid a prolonged procedural debate. What is important now is to move forward towards the completion of the task that the United Nations General Assembly has entrusted to us and which the world community expects of us.

35. In this connexion I wish to point out the significance of current international action to ensure that all countries which have not yet done so adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As regards further possible measures in this connexion, we would propose that all countries proceed to —

First, immediate consideration of the possibility of placing, by law, all institutions engaged in chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons research, development and production under the control of the respective ministries of health — that is, the civil administration;

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Second, immediate examination of the possibility of unilateral renunciation of research into and production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and of the closing down of all facilities directly related to research into and production and stockpiling of biological weapons.

36. There is also the problem of verification. We are aware of the fact that this question is far from being clarified. We know there are many difficulties in this regard which, in my opinion, are soluble if the necessary political will for their solution exists. If we compare the risk involved in imperfect control with the risk involved in the continuation of the present danger of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the truth will be confirmed once again that the former danger is far less than the latter. I wonder, would it not be possible, in addition to our own efforts here, to set up a small group of competent experts with the task of presenting to us, for example in the next few months, proposals for the solution of the problem of verification?

37. I do not intend at this stage to deal specially with the problem of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as our position in this respect is well known. I should like only to stress that the existing Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) represents in itself an obligation which has to be fulfilled. Therefore we are right to expect the completion of this Treaty without any further delay. Although a comprehensive test-ban Treaty is one of the issues which are primarily the subject of discussion and negotiation between the nuclear-weapon Powers, experience shows that in this domain too there is room for much useful work by this Committee.

38. As regards the draft treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed (CCD/269/Rev.1), we had an intensive discussion in the Committee last year as well as at the United Nations General Assembly, where a considerable degree of agreement was achieved. My delegation has studied very carefully all the proposals and amendments submitted, and we think that the existing differences could soon be reconciled. We have submitted our own proposals and amendments and are ready to engage in further consultations with other delegations as soon as the new draft has been submitted to the Committee. Adequate methods should be used for the completion of the treaty so as to enable us to move forward to other high-priority questions before the Committee.

(Mr. Vratusa, Yugoslavia)

39. May I mention one more question which has been referred to by a number of speakers? I have in mind the most important problem of general and complete disarmament. We share the view expressed by several delegations that it is high time we began dealing with it in a systematic and organized way. As this issue is a very complex one, we shall return to it at a later stage in our work.

40. I will now pass on to the Disarmament Decade. Many speakers who preceded me referred to it. We have studied their statements with great interest and have been impressed by a large number of the suggestions. I should like to take this opportunity to offer some of the preliminary views of the Yugoslav delegation.

41. The period of the cold war is behind us, although many of its effects are still present in international relations. The phase of confrontation between the great Powers is gradually being replaced by negotiations in which problems of disarmament must have a high order of priority. In Europe we have recently been witnessing positive trends and intensive activities aimed at strengthening equitable co-operation and creating conditions in which essential progress in developing European security could be obtained. The non-aligned countries have been increasing their activity in the search for peace, independence, disarmament, security and development, particularly in connexion with their preparations for the forthcoming summit conference. And, last but not least, this is the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations which offers a good opportunity for a mobilization for further efforts in all fields.

42. All these circumstances have been creating more favourable conditions for broader political action aimed at stopping the arms race and at promoting disarmament. On the other hand, the advance towards disarmament is too slow and the escalation in the arms race is rapidly progressing. The rhythm of this escalation could even be accelerated in the coming years. The gap between the pace of disarmament and that of the armaments race is widening instead of getting narrower. Therefore we should act more efficiently, with more courage and determination.

43. My delegation views the Disarmament Decade as a means of stimulating activities aimed at solving the complex problem of disarmament and at making those activities rational and effective, in order to create a well-defined, comprehensive programme. The substance of the Decade is there. It can be defined without particular difficulty. Let me mention only some major issues and fields of such a possible programme:

(Mr. Vratusa, Yugoslavia)

The implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty in all three major fields -- disarmament, international security, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy --, including its review conference after five years;

Completion of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1);

Numerous partial measures of disarmament which should create better conditions for general and complete disarmament;

Concrete measures for strengthening international peace and security, including the establishment of denuclearized zones and zones of reduced armament;

The use of science and technology only for peaceful purposes;

Steady work on general and complete disarmament, which must be purposeful and rationally conceived.

44. The main goal of such an endeavour should be to stop the wasteful use of the world's resources and energy for destruction and to convert them for productive purposes; to mobilize and organize all efforts for the earliest possible achievement of disarmament.

45. We are aware that we are going to be faced with difficulties of different kinds owing to the international relations prevailing in the world today, the nature of the issue, and the fact that there are different approaches as far as methods and procedures are concerned. We should also recognize that an attempt to draw up a rigid programme with fixed targets and the precise dynamics of advance would be a sisyphean task. This does not mean, however, that we should give up our efforts to determine the basic objectives and the course of action to be conducted during the seventies.

46. In order to draw up a realistically-formulated programme for the Decade, it seems necessary to proceed first of all to an intensive exchange of views on the various aspects of this action. We should also be inventive in using different methods of work already employed successfully by this body. I have in mind informal meetings, ad hoc working groups, special meetings, and improving them by new methods ensuring more coherence and continuity in the work. Thus conceived, the Decade would not remain merely an appeal for disarmament but would facilitate the adoption of individual measures for faster progress in disarmament.

(Mr. Vratusa, Yugoslavia)

47. We are fully aware of the fact that success in these fields cannot be achieved without a corresponding climate of confidence. However, we also know that the favourable climate will not come by itself. The creation of such a climate is completely in the hands of our governments. What we need above all is a general democratization of international relations, conceived as friendly co-operation among all States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Obviously, the more the sovereignty and independence of each individual country is respected, the more substantive will be their contribution to this aim. Only in such circumstances can disarmament become a successful common endeavour in an atmosphere of mutual trust among nations, stimulating also other positive processes in the world.

48. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): A few days ago, on 5 March, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) entered into force. The representatives of Hungary and Yugoslavia devoted part of their statements today to this important event. The non-proliferation Treaty is the most important international agreement on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament concluded in the nuclear era. The conclusion of this Treaty has a direct bearing on the strengthening of international security and the safeguarding of universal peace. By setting up a barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty reduces the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Its significance lies in the fact that in an era of great scientific discoveries it demonstrates the desire of man to limit the possibility of the military use of the atom's power.

49. Speaking at the ceremony marking the deposit of instruments of ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Chairman of the Council of Ministries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin, stated:

> "Ever since nuclear weapons made their appearance, the policy of the Soviet Union has been invariably directed towards ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an important step towards this objective, since it sets up a definite barrier to the further proliferation of such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as nuclear weapons."

The text of this statement by Mr. Kosygin has been issued as a document of the Committee dated 6 March 1970 (CCD/279).

50. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is also a great success for the Committee on Disarmament, within which the Treaty was prepared and agreed. This event, we are convinced, will help to make the work

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

of our Conference more effective and will create new stimuli and prospects for further fruitful activity by the Committee, including that of concluding as speedily as possible a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their destruction, and of a treaty on prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. The Soviet Union regards most seriously the obligation under the Treaty to pursue negotiations on disarmament in a spirit of good will and is ready, as in the past, to co-operate with all other countries in reaching agreement on the cessation of the arms race, above all in nuclear weapons, and on working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

51. In noting today with satisfaction the entry into force of one of the most important international agreements concluded by States since the Second World War, we express the hope that the efforts of all States members of the Committee on Disarmament will be directed towards making further progress along the path envisaged by the provisions of that Treaty.

52. Mr. ABE (Japan): At the outset I should like to express my deep appreciation of the warm welcome extended to me by many members of this Committee. It is indeed a great honour for me to participate in the discussions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the principal forum for dealing with arms control and disarmament. I will spare no efforts to make my contributions to the work of the Committee as valuable as possible, with the continuous help of the Secretariat, headed by Mr. Epstein.

53. Since this is my first intervention in the 1970 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I would like to express today my Government's basic views on some of the major issues before the Committee.

54. Last year the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, proposed that the 1970s should be made the Disarmament Decade. Thereupon the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275), which "Declares the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade". Moreover, on 18 February last the Secretary-General, speaking in this forum, emphasized the significance of the Disarmament Decade (CCD/PV.450). In view of the fact that the present arms race is posing a serious threat to world peace and that disarmament would greatly advance the welfare of mankind, the Japanese delegation considers that the Secretary-General's initiative in this matter is the most opportune one, for which he deserves the highest credit and our thanks.

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

55. The present arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race among nuclear-weapon States, constitutes such a menace to the very existence of mankind as has never been witnessed in history before. We should therefore do our utmost to remove this threat. At the same time we should not overlook the fact that, if the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament are brought about, all States would be able to transfer a substantial part of their resources to the furtherance of the well-being of their peoples. And the prospect would become brighter for increasing aid for the economic and social development of developing countries, whose peoples constitute two thirds of the world's population.

56. The above-mentioned General Assembly resolution requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)). Undoubtedly to work out a comprehensive programme is useful to achieve the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament; and many delegations have stressed the particular importance of such a programme.

57. My delegation shares their views. We believe that, in order to achieve general and complete disarmament, it is not sufficient merely to work out a programme; but the programme itself should be flexible enough to be workable. Furthermore, my delegation wishes to emphasize that it is essential to mould public opinion, both national and international, so that it will give constant support to the implementation of our programme. We believe that throughout the Disarmament Decade we should give full attention to the question of how to acquaint public opinion with the purposes and objectives of the Decade.

58. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) came into force, as we all know, on the fifth of this month. I would like to take this opportunity to state that Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with her policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace. Therefore

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

on 3 February last the Japanese Government signed the Treaty. This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time, the nuclear-weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.

59. In the context of the discussions we wish to re-emphasize article VI of this Treaty, which provides that --

> "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (ibid.)

60. Furthermore, the prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to control over them. Therefore, this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon States in their research, development or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international co-operation in these fields; nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.

61. It is for this reason that my Government attaches great importance to the progress and outcome of the safeguards agreements negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with article III of the Treaty. The Japanese Government also believes that concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty relating to international co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions.

62. As I said earlier, with the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty we should now follow more closely than ever developments and progress in nuclear disarmament negotiations. That is why my Government attaches such great importance to the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States which are expected to be held in Vienna from 16 April; and it strongly hopes that the talks will produce positive results.

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

63. I wish to believe that the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty and the forthcoming talks in Vienna were the indication of good promise for the acceleration of nuclear disarmament. By taking advantage of this momentum we should be able to find a way of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which would be an important first step towards nuclear disarmament. With this in mind I should like to urge that all the countries represented here, including the United States and the Soviet Union, will continue to make strenuous efforts to find a solution to this long-standing problem of a comprehensive test ban.

64. It is true that in order to achieve a comprehensive test ban there are still various technical problems to be solved, besides the political decision to be made by the nuclear-weapon States.

65. At last year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the Japanese delegation, taking into account developments in recent years in seismological means of detection and identification of underground nuclear test explosions, ventured to suggest a two-tier solution to the problem, based on a certain level of magnitude of underground events which are detectable and identifiable at present (ENDC/PV.424, paras. 45-56; ENDC/260). The solution which our representative suggested may not be a perfect one from a technical point of view; none the less we believe that it is the most workable one that present circumstances permit. Therefore we should not abandon further consideration of such a solution merely because it is not technically flawless.

66. That is the reason why we appreciate the initiative taken by the Canadian delegation which led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV) concerning the question of an international seismic data exchange. We are firmly convinced that international exchange of seismic data constitutes the very first concrete step leading to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. We would like to appeal once again to all countries, in particular to major countries directly involved, to respond to the request made to them by the United Nations Secretary-General (CCD/PV.450, para. 18).

67. According to the General Assembly resolution, the required information is to be supplied to the Secretary-General by 1 May 1970. The Secretary-General, in turn, is asked to circulate all responses to governments and to members of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation believes that the Committee should, during its present session, initiate the study of how to deal with the information which will be made available through the Secretary-General. I wish to point out that, if the Committee

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

fails to take appropriate concrete measures to follow up that resolution, the valuable contribution of the Canadian delegation in this field (ENDC/251/Rev.1) may be rendered fruitless and the General Assembly resolution may remain yet another piece of paper.

68. In connexion with the question of a comprehensive test ban, on 18 February this year the representative of Sweden pointed out the problem of radioactive leakage from underground nuclear explosions (CCD/PV.450, paras.42-44). My Government shares the concern expressed by the Swedish representative. Moreover, we are much concerned over earthquakes or tidal waves which might result from underground nuclear explosions.

69. Another problem which we should not overlook, as it relates to one of the important measures leading to nuclear disarmament, is that of the cessation of production of fissionable nuclear materials for use in weapons and the transfer of such materials to peaceful purposes. In discussing nuclear disarmament we should take into consideration aspects of the quality and the quantity of nuclear weapons. In the view of my delegation the best way to check the qualitative sophistication of nuclear weapons is to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to which I have just referred. On the other hand, the most effective way to curb the increase in quantity of nuclear weapons is to halt the production of fissionable nuclear materials for use in weapons and to transfer existing stocks of those materials to use for peaceful purposes.

70. As in the case of other disarmament measures, the question of verification has been the biggest obstacle. In that connexion, the Japanese representative stated at last year's session of this Committee that a system of safeguards similar to that which is to be applied to non-nuclear-weapon States by the IAEA, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must also be applicable as a verification measure in this case (ENDC/PV.416, para.70). My Government welcomes therefore the suggestion made by the United States representative last year that the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons be verified by means of IAEA safeguards (ENDC/PV.401, paras.7,8). My delegation is hopeful that the Committee will discuss this question and that it will succeed in working out a draft agreement on this question.

71. An urgent issue for the Committee on Disarmament to tackle is the completion of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Since my delegation made specific comments (ENDC/PV.420) on the draft treaty (CCD/269/Rev.1) last year, I do not want to take up the time of the Committee

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

by repeating them. At this juncture, however, I should like to point out that the divergence of views among States over certain points of the draft treaty does not seem to be unsurmountable through our concerted efforts. I therefore sincerely hope that the Committee, by using every opportunity through either formal or informal meetings, will be able to finalize a draft treaty acceptable to us all in the course of the present session.

72. Last but not least, I should like to make some observations on the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, over which intensive discussion took place at the last sessions of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly. In doing so I base myself on further studies on the subject carried out in my country.

73. It has already been made clear, in the statement of the representative of my country on 14 August last, that Japan has great interest in and deep concern on the question of chemical and biological weapons (ENDC/PV.428, paras.31-49). In this connexion, we welcome the statements of the President of the United States on the question of chemical and biological weapons issued on 25 November last year and 14 February this year (CCD/PV.449, paras.23 et seq.), as they will bring a favourable atmosphere into the discussion of the question of C.B. weapons in this Committee. Furthermore, we highly appreciate the decision of President Nixon declaring as the new policy of the United States the unilateral renunciation of biological and toxins weapons.

74. Fundamentally the Japanese Government holds the view that not only the use of chemical and biological weapons, but also the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological agents from which these weapons can be made, should be prohibited, inasmuch as both chemical and biological weapons would cause equally indiscriminate mass destruction if they were ever used in a war. The United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted last year requested us to give our urgent consideration to this matter (resolution 2603 B (XXIV).

75. In order to facilitate the work of our Committee on this question, my delegation ventures to suggest that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should first try to reach basic agreements on matters of substance regarding the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and then, as a next stage, proceed to the consideration of the legal formula embodying such agreements. We have now before us two draft conventions on the question of chemical and biological weapons, submitted

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

respectively by the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) and by the Soviet Union and eight other States (A/7655). I should like to pay tribute to those countries for the initiative taken by them.

76. The draft convention put forward by the Soviet Union and eight other States is more comprehensive with respect to the scope of weapons to be prohibited, as it covers both chemical and biological weapons. However, in the views of my delegation the draft convention fails to provide effective safeguards for ensuring compliance with the obligations of the convention, particularly in the case of violation of the prohibitions. We have noted in this connexion the statement of the representative of Poland on 24 February regarding the safeguards clause which he said would strengthen the main provisions of the draft convention (CCD/PV.452, para.18). We are prepared to study such a proposal when it is introduced to this Committee.

77. I wish now to turn to the United Kingdom draft convention. I feel that the draft as it stands, although it is very well written and obviously based on thorough study, does not adequately meet the wishes of my delegation, since the scope of weapons to be prohibited is limited to biological weapons. Yet apart from this the United Kingdom draft convention extends the scope of activities to be prohibited to the use, research, production and stockpiling of such weapons. Also it takes into account the question of ensuring compliance with the obligations of the convention.

78. The British draft convention provides that, in a case where a State party believes that biological methods of warfare have been used against it, the State party may lodge a complaint directly with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and request that the complaint be investigated. And in a case where a State party believes that biological methods of warfare have been used against another State, or in a case where a State party believes that another party has acted in breach of its undertaking regarding the research, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, the State party may lodge a complaint with the Security Council and request that the complaint be investigated.

79. If we confine ourselves to the question of the violation of the ban on the use of biological and chemical weapons, we believe that, on the basis of present technical knowledge and experience, the violation of the prohibition of the use of those weapons could be verified with a considerable degree of certainty, provided that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could act without delay on previously-arranged preparations for implementing such investigations, with the co-operation extended to him by competent international experts.

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

80. Difficulty remains in the case of a suspicion that the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of these weapons is violated. Even in this case the procedure for lodging a complaint with the Security Council, or preferably with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the investigation of a complaint by the Secretary-General supported by the co-operation of competent international experts, would be effective to a considerable extent. We must admit, however, that verification is more difficult in this regard, both technically and politically, than in the case of the use of these weapons. Furthermore, in the view of experts in this field, verification of chemical weapons would involve much greater technical difficulties than that of biological weapons.

81. It does not necessarily follow that we cannot overcome the technical difficulties involved, however great they seem to be at present, as we make further progress in technical studies on this question. Accordingly, we still believe it useful, as suggested by my delegation last year, to hold an international meeting of experts to study technical aspects of verification relating to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons.

82. Those are the basic views of my delegation on the matters of substance regarding the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. To sum up, they are as follows:

First, with regard to the scope of weapons to be prohibited, both chemical and biological weapons should be considered at the same time.

Second, the scope of activities to be prohibited should cover use, development, production and stockpiling.

Third, there should be established (a) a complaint procedure with direct recourse to the United Nations Secretary-General or the Security Council in case of the suspected violation of the prohibition not only of the use but also of the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical weapons and biological weapons; and (b) an arrangement through which investigation could be carried out promptly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the co-operation of competent international experts. (To this end we suggest that a roster of experts to be made available for such an investigation should be provided for and kept by the Secretary-General).

Fourth, an international meeting of experts should be held as early as possible in order to examine how to establish and improve effective means of

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

verification for the compliance with the obligation of prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, with particular emphasis on chemical weapons.

I sincerely hope that other delegations here will present their views first on the matters of substance as illustrated today by my delegation, so that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may reach basic agreements on them in the course of our discussions. With respect to the question of a legal formula embodying such agreements, I should like to express the views of my delegation at a later stage; since this is closely connected with the outcome of our deliberations on the matters of substance.

83. Today I have outlined the basic views of the Japanese Government on some of the major issues before this Committee. My delegation would like to express its views in further details as discussions proceed on those issues. As to other questions of equal importance, which I have not touched upon today, I wish to be permitted to present our opinion in due course as they are taken up by the Committee.

84. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I should like to speak just very briefly to invite the Committee's attention to the working paper (CCD/281) which the United States delegation has submitted. This paper contains the remarks made by President Nixon at the ceremony in Washington on 5 March which marked the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). I do not think I need add anything at this time to what we have already said about the importance which the United States attaches to this Treaty and to the fact that it has now come into force. At the ceremony in Washington, President Nixon paid particular tribute to those in our own Government and in other governments who were responsible for the success in negotiating the non-proliferation Treaty. I am sure that many of you who worked with Ambassador Foster during those negotiations will be pleased to note the remarks which were addressed to him by the President.

85. LORD CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I have only a few, very brief remarks to make. In my opening speech at this session I referred, as many other speakers have done, to our hope that the non-proliferation Treaty would soon receive the necessary number of ratifications to bring it into force. This has now happened, and the Committee has before it the text of the statement made by my Prime Minister on the

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on 5 March. I think it is true to say that, thanks to the work of the 1960s, the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s has got off to a very propitious start.

86. In the course of his remarks in London at the ceremony to mark the entry into force of the Treaty, the Prime Minister paid a tribute to the work of this Committee. He said:

> "Finally I should like to pay on behalf of all of us a tribute to the dedicated teamwork which has brought us to this point. I am thinking particularly of the distinguished members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva who worked with dedication and courage for so many years to lay the foundation for this treaty ... The work of this Committee shows us how goodwill and commonsense and statesmanship can triumph, whatever the political differences that separate the nations." (CCD/280)

87. I hope that we shall very soon have other substantial measures to show for our work here. To be really effective, of course, the non-proliferation Treaty still needs two things. First of all it needs ratification and accession by more States; and secondly, and perhaps more important, it requires further measures of arms control and disarmament not only here but, we hope, in the strategic arms limitation talks which are shortly to be resumed between the Soviet Union and the United States.

88. Finally, I should like to mention one point which is very much in my mind. It has already been mentioned at least once this morning. It is the question of safeguards and the non-proliferation Treaty. Now that the Treaty is in force we have, as everybody here is well aware, 180 days from 5 March in which to begin to work out an effective system of safeguards. I need hardly say that we here in Geneva will be watching with very great interest how things develop on this subject in Vienna.

89. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I shall also be extremely brief. The Canadian delegation would not like this occasion to pass without its emphasizing the importance and significance which the Canadian Government attaches to the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty. I have not circulated a text, but may I be permitted to read part of what my Foreign Minister said in the House of Commons on the occasion of the ratification ceremonies in Moscow, Washington and London? He said this:

> "I should like to take a few minutes of the time of the House in order to welcome an historic development marking the most important achievement to date in the field of arms control ...

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

"This convention is the culmination of more than five years of negotiations /in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee/ in which Canada played a significant role. Canada ratified the treaty on January 8, 1969, and was in fact the first nation with a technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons to renounce this weapons option by ratifying the non-proliferation Treaty. We shall continue to stress the importance of adherence to the Treaty by those States that already have or are close to attaining the technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons — the so-called 'near-nuclear' nations.

"Canada welcomes the coming into force of this Treaty and urges all countries to make it an effective means of counteracting the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hope that those nations which have signed the Treaty but not yet ratified it, as well as those which have not yet signed, will proceed to ratification and implement its safeguards provisions designed to preclude proliferation. Finally, we hope and expect that, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, this substantial step forward will inspire renewed efforts to curtail the arms race."

90. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): As all previous speakers have testified, we are today celebrating an important event in the history of disarmament for which this Committee can take the main credit. The Treaty on non-proliferation has finally entered into force; and in a statement made on 9 January, when Sweden ratified the Treaty, the Swedish Government expressed the hope that other States would ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. That statement went on to make a few more comments which I now wish to quote:

"It is also now important that agreements on the international safeguards system shall be reached in the near future. With this aim in view, the relevant negotiations of individual countries as well as the EURATOM with the International Atomic Energy Agency should be accelerated. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, however, only a small step on the road towards disarmament, even if it is an important one. The present situation demands more than at any other time that the super-Powers responsible for the development in this field show their political will in the efforts to reach agreements, primarily on arms limitation and subsequently, as soon as possible,

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

on disarmament proper. Sweden, for its part, will continue to stress the world's interest both in a strategic arms limitation of the super-Powers and in agreements on a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. So far, the SALT negotiations in Helsinki are probably the most obvious evidence of a readiness to move in the right direction. Efforts must now also be directed towards a prevention of the production of other weapons of mass destruction, primarily biological and chemical weapons. A first stage has been reached also in this field inasmuch as the United Nations at its newly-ended twenty-fourth session confirmed, with an overwhelming majority, that the international prohibition against the use of such weapons in war is total and without exception."

91. I wish finally to remind my colleagues of the proposal that I stressed in my first intervention at this session on 18 February, namely that the Committee should take some action now, not only in relation to negotiations according to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty but also as to the contents of the special international agreement or agreements foreseen in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty (CCD/PV.450, paras.45-47). I continue to hold the view that this is an important and urgent task which should be undertaken primarily by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

92. Mr. NATORF (Poland): On the instructions of my Government I too would like to make a brief statement in connexion with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

93. Since the day the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons found its way on to the agenda of this Committee, Poland has been among those who spared no effort in order to draw up a treaty to this effect. That is why Poland was present in Moscow, Washington and London on 1 July 1968 for the signature of the non-proliferation Treaty -- a Treaty which was soon afterwards ratified by the Polish State Council.

94. On numerous occasions Poland has stressed the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty for strengthening peace and creating favourable conditions for further efforts to stop the arms race and to implement effective measures for banning and destroying nuclear weapons. It is obvious that Poland welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty, which creates favourable conditions for global disarmament measures as well

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

as for measures of a regional character. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and a number of draft treaties tabled at this Conference are definite signs that the non-proliferation Treaty is being followed by other adequate measures as stipulated in article VI of the Treaty.

95. We are happy to note that substantial progress has been made in enabling all nations to benefit from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The most recent communiqué on the technical talks between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is very encouraging indeed. We realize that the full effectiveness of the Treaty depends to a large extent on its ratification by the threshold countries and particularly by States holding important political and strategic positions in Europe. That is why Poland is looking forward to speedy and effective implementation of the safeguards provided for in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty. Poland is ready to play its part in this direction.

96. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first meeting of the Committee since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I should like to remind its members that at our meeting on 13 August 1968 the delegation of Mexico had occasion to inform the Committee (ENDC/PV.389, para.37) of the full text of the identical notes which the Mexican Foreign Ministry addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the occasion of the signature by Mexico of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on 5 March 1970.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 455th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, representative of Argentina.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Poland and Mexico.

"The following documents were circulated:

'Declaration by the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connexion with the Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' (CCD/278).

'Statement by A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the Ceremony for the Deposit of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 1970' (CCD/279).

'Statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, M.P. at Lancaster House, London, on 5 March 1970, on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' (CCD/280).

'Remarks by President Nixon on the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Washington, D.C., 5 March 1970' (CCD/281).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 12 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.